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Introduc7on
Orthodox	 game	 theory	 idenAﬁes	 raAonal	 soluAons	 to	 interpersonal	 and	 strategically	 interdependent
decision	problems,	games,	using	the	noAon	of	individualisAc	best-response	reasoning.	When	each	player's
chosen	strategy	in	a	game	is	a	best	response	to	the	strategies	chosen	by	other	players,	they	are	said	to	be	in
a	 Nash	 equilibrium—a	 point	 at	which	 no	 player	 can	 beneﬁt	 by	 unilaterally	 changing	 his	 or	 her	 strategy.
Consider	 the	 Hi-Lo	 and	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 two-player	 games	 illustrated	 in	 Figures	 1	 and	 2.	 The
strategies	 available	 to	one	of	 the	 two	players	 are	 idenAﬁed	by	 rows	 and	 those	 available	 to	 the	other	 by
columns.	The	numbers	in	each	cell	represent	payoﬀs	to	the	row	and	the	column	players	respecAvely	in	each
of	the	four	possible	outcomes	in	these	games.
There	are	two	Nash	equilibria	in	the	Hi-Lo	game,	(Hi,	Hi)	and	(Lo,	Lo),	since,	for	either	player,	the	strategy	Hi
is	the	best	response	to	the	other	player's	choice	of	Hi	and	the	strategy	Lo	is	the	best	response	to	the	other's
choice	of	Lo.1	As	such,	individualisAc	best-response	reasoning	idenAﬁes	two	raAonal	soluAons	of	this	game
but	does	not	resolve	it	deﬁniAvely	for	the	interacAng	players.	For	many	people,	however,	(Lo,	Lo)	does	not
appear	to	be	a	raAonal	soluAon	and	it	seems	that	the	outcome	(Hi,	Hi)	is	a	clear	deﬁniAve	resoluAon	of	this
game.	In	 the	 case	of	 the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game,	 there	 is	only	one	Nash	equilibrium,	 (D,	D),	 since,	 for
either	 player,	 the	 strategy	D	 is	 the	 best	 response	 to	whatever	 the	 other	 player	 is	 going	 to	 do.	 As	 such,
individualisAc	best-response	reasoning	resolves	 this	game	deﬁniAvely.	However,	due	to	 the	 ineﬃciency	of
the	outcome	(D,	D)	compared	to	the	outcome	(C,	C)—both	players	are	beXer	oﬀ	in	the	laXer	than	they	are
in	the	former—for	some	the	outcome	(C,	C)	is	not	obviously	irraAonal	and	there	is	a	division	of	opinion	(at
least	 outside	 the	 circle	 of	 professional	 game	 theorists)	 about	what	 a	 raAonal	 player	 ought	 to	 do	 in	 this
game.
Orthodox	 game	 theory's	 inability	 to	 resolve	 these	 games	 saAsfactorily,	 in	 parAcular	 its	 inability	 to
deﬁniAvely	resolve	the	Hi-Lo	game,	moAvated	the	development	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning.2	According
1 These	are	Nash	equilibria	in	pure	strategies.	There	is	a	third	Nash	equilibrium	in	mixed	strategies,	 in	which	both
players	randomize	between	the	two	available	strategies	by	playing	Hi	with	probability	1/3	and	Lo	with	probability
2/3.	
2 For	some	of	the	early	and	later	theoreAcal	developments	see	Bacharach	(1999,	2006),	Sugden	(1993,	2000,	2003,	
2011,	2015),	Gold	and	Sugden	(2007a,	2007b),	and	Gold	(2012).
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C D
C 2,	2 0,	3
D 3,	0 1,	1
Figure	2:	The	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game
Hi Lo
Hi 2,	2 0,	0
Lo 0,	0 1,	1
Figure	1:	The	Hi-Lo	game
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to	 the	 theory	 of	 team	 reasoning,	 people	 may	 not	 always	 be	 employing	 individualisAc	 best-response
reasoning	 in	 games.	 The	 theory	 allows	 that	 people	 may,	 instead,	 idenAfy	 raAonal	 soluAons	 from	 the
perspecAve	of	a	team,	a	group	of	individuals	acAng	together	in	the	aXainment	of	the	best	outcome(s)	for
that	group.	This,	 in	turn,	enables	team	reasoning	to	show	how	the	Hi-Lo	game	can	be	raAonally	resolved
deﬁniAvely	and	how	the	outcome	(C,	C)	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	can	be	raAonalized.
The	theory	of	team	reasoning	gives	a	new	account	of	why	coordinaAon	and	cooperaAon	can	be	raAonal	by
introducing	the	possibility	of	mulAple	levels	of	agency	into	classical	game	theory.	But	it	is	also	supposed	to
tell	us	something	about	how	people	reason.	It	is	a	model	of	decision-making,	which	abstracts	and	simpliﬁes,
but	“it	captures	salient	features	of	real	human	reasoning”	(Sugden,	2000,	p.	178).	We	might	think	of	team
reasoning	as	operaAng	at	Marr's	(1982)	computaAonal	level,	specifying	the	goal	of	the	system	and	the	logic
behind	 the	 output,	 but	 leaving	 open	how	 the	 computaAon	 is	 implemented	 and	how	 it	 is	 realised	 in	 the
brain	(Gold,	in	press). 
A	number	of	diﬀerent	versions	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	have	been	proposed	and	developed.	These
diﬀer	with	 respect	 to	what	 triggers	 decision-makers'	 adopAon	of	 the	 team	mode	of	 reasoning	 and	what
team-reasoning	 individuals	 try	to	achieve.	We	review	these	developments	 in	the	ﬁrst	part	of	 this	chapter
(SecAons	1	to	3).	There	is	also	a	nascent	but	growing	body	of	experiments	that	aXempt	to	test	the	theory.
We	review	some	of	these	studies	in	the	second	part	(SecAons	4	to	6).	Finally,	with	SecAon	7	we	conclude
and	present	a	suggesAon	for	further	experimental	work	in	this	ﬁeld.
I.	Theory
1.	What	is	Team	Reasoning?
The	individualisAc	best-response	reasoning	of	orthodox	game	theory	is	based	on	the	quesAon	of	which	of
the	available	strategies	in	a	game	a	parAcular	player	should	take,	given	his	or	her	individual	preferences	and
his	or	her	beliefs	about	what	the	other	players	are	going	to	do.	Each	player's	personal	moAvaAons	in	games
are	 represented	 by	 the	 payoﬀ	 numbers	 they	 associate	 with	 the	 available	 outcomes,	 and	 the	 opAmal
strategy	is	that	which	gives	the	player	in	quesAon	the	highest	expected	payoﬀ.	In	this	light,	the	best	strategy
for	 an	 individualisAcally	 reasoning	 player	 in	 the	 Hi-Lo	 game	 (see	 Figure	 1	 above)	 is	 condiAonal	 on	 that
player's	belief	about	what	the	other	player	is	going	to	do:	play	Hi	or	play	Lo.	In	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game
(see	Figure	2)	the	best	strategy	is	uncondiAonally	to	play	D.
Team	reasoning,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	based	on	the	quesAon	of	what	 is	opAmal	 for	 the	group	of	players
acAng	together	as	a	team.	A	team	reasoner	ﬁrst	 idenAﬁes	an	outcome	of	a	game	that	best	promotes	the
interests	of	the	team	and	then	chooses	the	strategy	that	is	his	or	her	part	of	aXaining	that	outcome.	If	the
outcome	 (Hi,	Hi)	 is	 idenAﬁed	 as	 uniquely	 opAmal	 for	 the	 team,	 then	 team	 reasoning	 resolves	 the	 Hi-Lo
game	deﬁniAvely.	Similarly,	if	any	of	the	outcomes	associated	with	the	play	of	C	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma
game,	e.g.,	the	outcome	(C,	C),	are	ranked	at	the	top	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	team,	the	strategy	C	can
be	raAonalized.
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 reasoning	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 team	 is	 not	 a	mere	 transformaAon	 of	 players'
personal	payoﬀ	numbers	associated	with	the	available	outcomes	in	games.	To	see	this,	consider	again	the
Hi-Lo	game.	Suppose	that,	 from	the	point	of	view	of	the	team,	the	outcome	(Hi,	Hi)	 is	deemed	to	be	the
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best,	 the	 outcome	 (Lo,	 Lo)	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 second-best	 and	 the	 outcomes	 (Hi,	 Lo)	 and	 (Lo,	Hi)	 the
worst.	 Replacing	 the	 two	 players'	 original	 payoﬀ	 numbers	 with	 numbers	 that	 correspond	 to	 the	 team's
ranking	of	the	four	outcomes	in	the	game	does	not	change	the	payoﬀ	structure	of	the	original	game	in	any
way,	since	the	players'	individual	payoﬀs	are	already	in	line	with	the	valuaAon	of	outcomes	from	the	team's
perspecAve.	The	key	diﬀerence	here	is	that	individualisAc	reasoning	is	based	on	evaluaAng	and	choosing	a
parAcular	strategy	based	on	the	associated	expected	personal	payoﬀ,	whereas	team	reasoning	is	based	on
evaluaAng	the	outcomes	of	the	game	from	the	perspecAve	of	the	team,	and	then	choosing	a	strategy	that	is
associated	with	the	opAmal	outcome	for	the	team.
There	are	two	important	quesAons	that	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	needs	to	address:	“when	do	people
reason	as	members	of	a	 team?”	and	“what	do	people	 try	 to	achieve	when	they	reason	as	members	of	a
team?”.	In	other	words,	 is	 it	possible	to	idenAfy	circumstances	or	types	of	games	in	which	the	interacAng
players	are	likely	to	adopt	team	reasoning	and	the	mechanism	by	which	they	adopt	it,	and,	once	they	team
reason,	is	it	possible	to	specify	a	funcAonal	representaAon	of	what	they	take	the	goals	of	the	team	to	be?
We	turn	to	reviewing	the	various	proposals	for	answering	these	quesAons	in	the	following	two	secAons.
2.	What	Triggers	Team	Reasoning?
Diﬀerent	versions	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	have	diﬀerent	answers	to	the	quesAon	of	when	people
team	 reason.	 One	 answer,	 mainly	 associated	 with	 Bacharach	 (2006),	 is	 that	 the	 mode	 of	 reasoning	 an
individual	uses	 is	a	maXer	of	 that	decision-maker's	psychological	make-up,	which	 in	 turn	may	depend	on
certain	features	of	the	context	 in	which	decisions	are	made,	but	otherwise	 lies	outside	of	the	 individual's
conscious	 control.	 A	 second	 answer,	 proﬀered	 by	 Sugden	 (2003),	 is	 that	 an	 individual	 may	 choose	 to
endorse	 a	 parAcular	mode	 of	 reasoning	 based	 on	 consideraAons	 about	 the	 potenAal	 beneﬁts	 of	 one	 or
another	possible	mode	of	reasoning	and	his	or	her	beliefs	about	the	modes	of	reasoning	endorsed	by	other
players,	 but	 this	 choice	 is	 outside	 of	 raAonal	 evaluaAon.	 A	 third	 possibility,	 proposed	 by	 Hurley	 (2005a,
2005b),	 is	 that	 individual	 decision-makers	 come	 to	 choose	 the	 team	 mode	 of	 reasoning	 as	 a	 result	 of
raAonal	deliberaAon	itself.
The	ﬁrst	posiAon,	the	idea	that	the	adopAon	of	team	reasoning	is	outside	of	an	individual's	control,	can	be
found	 in	the	version	of	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning	presented	by	Bacharach	(2006)	and	Smerilli	 (2012).
Here	the	mode	of	reasoning	that	an	individual	adopts	is	a	maXer	of	a	psychological	frame	through	which	he
or	 she	 sees	 a	 decision	 problem.	The	 idea	 is	 similar	 to	 that	of	 Tversky	and	Kahneman	 (1981,	p.453),	who
deﬁne	a	 frame	as,	 “the	decision-maker’s	 concepAon	of	 the	acts,	outcomes,	and	conAngencies	associated
with	a	parAcular	choice”.	In	Tversky	and	Kahneman's	Prospect	Theory,	framing	a	decision	in	terms	of	losses
or	gains	aﬀects	the	part	of	the	value	funcAon	that	decision-makers	apply,
thus	 aﬀecAng	 their	 choices.	 In	 Bacharach's	 theory	 of	 team	 reasoning,
framing	a	decision	in	terms	of	“we”	or	“I”	aﬀects	the	goals	that	decision-
makers	aim	to	achieve,	which	one	might	think	of	as	using	the	individual
or	the	group	value	funcAon,	and	the	mode	of	reasoning	that	they	apply.
If	the	individual	frames	the	decision	problem	as	a	problem	for	him	or	her
individually,	i.e.,	in	terms	of	individualisAc	best-response	reasoning,	then
he	or	she	idenAﬁes	soluAons	oﬀered	by	that	mode	of	reasoning	alone.	If,
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 individual	 frames	 the	 decision	 problem	 as	 a
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problem	for	a	group	of	players	acAng	together	as	a	team,	i.e.,	 in	terms	of	team	reasoning,	then	he	or	she
idenAﬁes	soluAons	oﬀered	by	team	reasoning	and	not	by	individualisAc	reasoning.	This	idea	can	be	likened
to	that	of	seeing	either	a	goblet	or	two	faces	in	the	goblet	illusion	picture	illustrated	in	Figure	3	(also	known
as	the	Rubin's	vase).	Looking	at	this	picture	it	is	possible	to	see	either	a	goblet	or	two	faces	opposite	from
each	other,	but	only	one	of	these	images	at	a	Ame	and	not	both	of	them	simultaneously.	In	the	same	way,	a
decision-maker	 is	 said	 to	 frame	 a	 decision	 problem	either	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	of	 individualisAc	 best-
responding	or	from	the	point	of	view	of	reasoning	as	a	member	of	a	team,	but	not	in	terms	of	both	these
perspecAves	at	the	same	Ame.3
The	psychological	frame	through	which	an	individual	analyzes	a	parAcular	decision	problem	may	depend	on
factors	that	lie	outside	of	the	descripAon	of	a	game,	but	it	can	be	inﬂuenced	by	the	payoﬀ	structure	of	the
game	 itself:	 Bacharach	 menAons	 as	 possible	 triggers	 the	 strong	 interdependence	 and	 double-crossing
features.	Roughly	speaking,	strong	interdependence	occurs	when	there	 is	a	Nash	equilibrium	that	is	worse
than	some	other	outcome	in	the	game	from	every	player's	individual	point	of	view.	Both	the	Hi-Lo	and	the
Prisoner's	Dilemma	games	have	this	feature:	in	Hi-Lo,	the	Nash	equilibrium	(Lo,	Lo)	is	worse	for	both	players
than	 the	 outcome	 (Hi,	 Hi);	 in	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma,	 the	 outcome	 (D,	 D)	 is	 worse	 for	 both	 than	 the
outcome	(C,	C).	This	means	that	the	outcomes	(Lo,	Lo)	and	(D,	D)	are	not	Pareto	eﬃcient.	(An	outcome	of	a
game	 is	 said	 to	 be	 Pareto	 eﬃcient	 if	 there	 is	 no	 other	 outcome	 available	 that	would	make	 some	 player
beXer-oﬀ	without	 at	 the	 same	Ame	making	 any	 other	 player	worse-oﬀ.)	 According	 to	 Bacharach,	 strong
interdependence	increases	the	likelihood	that	an	individual	would	frame	a	decision-problem	as	a	problem
for	a	team.
The	 double-crossing	 feature	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 individual	 personally	 beneﬁAng	 from	 a	 unilateral
deviaAon	 from	 the	 team	 reasoning	 soluAon.	 It	 is	 the	 incenAve	 to	 act	 on	 individual	 reasoning	when	 one
believes	that	the	other	player	is	acAng	on	team	reasoning.	This	feature	is	present	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma
but	 not	 the	 Hi-Lo	 game.	 In	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma,	 each	 individual	 would	 personally	 beneﬁt	 from	 a
unilateral	 deviaAon	 from	 the	 cooperaAve	 play	 of	 (C,	C).	 There	 is	 an	 incenAve	 to	 double-cross	 the	 other
player,	playing	D	if	the	other	player	is	expected	to	play	C.	According	to	Bacharach,	the	possibility	of	double
crossing	decreases	the	likelihood	of	a	parAcular	decision-maker	framing	a	decision	problem	as	a	problem	for
a	 team.	 Smerilli	 (2012)	 formalizes	 this	 intuiAon,	 providing	 a	 model	 where	 the	 double-crossing	 feature
causes	players	to	vacillate	between	frames.
Another	 possibility,	 suggested	 by	Bardsley	 (2000,	 Ch.	 5,	 SecAon	 6),	 is	 that	 payoﬀ	diﬀerences	within	 cells
introduce	 an	 inter-individual	 aspect	 to	 game	 situaAons	 and	 Pareto	 superior	 outcomes	 a	 collecAve	 one,
which	respecAvely	inhibit	or	promote	team	reasoning.	Zizzo	and	Tan	(2007)	introduce	the	noAon	of	“game
harmony”,	a	generic	game	property	describing	how	conﬂictual	or	non-conﬂictual	the	players'	interests	are,
and	 suggest	 some	ways	of	measuring	 it,	 the	simplest	one	being	 just	 the	correlaAon	between	the	players'
payoﬀs	across	outcomes.	 They	 show	 that	 game	harmony	measures	 can	predict	 cooperaAon	 in	 some	2x2
games	(i.e.	two-player	games	with	two	strategies	available	to	each	player).	Note	that	this	is	a	diﬀerent	idea
3 However,	see	Bacharach	(1997)	for	a	model	where,	as	well	as	the	“I	frame”	and	the	“we	frame”,	there	is	also	an	“S	
(superordinate)	frame”,	which	is	acAve	when	someone	manages	to	see	a	problem	from	both	the	“I”	and	the	“we”	
perspecAves.	Someone	in	the	“S	frame”	is	sAll	compelled	only	to	evaluate	the	outcomes	from	either	an	“I”	or	a	
“we”	perspecAve,	and	the	cooperaAve	opAon	is	chosen	by	a	player	in	the	“S	frame”	if	it	is	the	best	opAon	from	the
perspecAve	of	team	reasoning	and	not	worse	than	any	other	raAonal	soluAon	in	terms	of	individualisAc	best-
responding.
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from	Bacharach's	 strong	 interdependence	and	double	 crossing	 features	 (as	noted	by	Bacharach,	2006,	p.
83).	The	measures	agree	in	pure	coordinaAon	games,	where	players'	interests	are	perfectly	aligned,	and	in
zero-sum	games,	where	players'	interests	are	perfectly	opposed.	However,	in	mixed	moAve	games,	the	two
ideas	do	not	always	point	in	the	same	direcAon.	Bacharach	is	clear	that	common	interest	is	strong	when	the
possible	 gains	 from	coordinaAon	are	high	or	 the	 losses	 from	coordinaAon	 failure	 are	 great,	which	 leaves
open	how	consensual	players'	interests	are	in	general,	whereas	game	harmony	is	simply	a	measure	of	how
consensual	 players'	 interests	 are	 and	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 size	 of	 the	 potenAal	 gains	 from
cooperaAon.
In	 addiAon	 to	 the	 structural	 features	 of	 games	 themselves,	 priming	 group	 or	 individualisAc	 thinking	 in
decision-makers	could	be	expected	to	also	play	an	important	role	in	determining	which	frame	of	mind	the
individuals	would	be	in	and	which	mode	of	reasoning	they	would	use	in	games.	Bacharach	(2006)	surveys
the	literature	from	social	psychology	on	group	idenAty,	the	eﬀect	of	social	categorizaAon	and	the	minimal
group	paradigm,	and	took	himself	to	be	contribuAng	to	that	literature.	Group	idenAty	may	be	triggered	by
players'	 recogniAon	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 social	 group	 or	 a	 parAcular	 category,	 having	 common
interests,	 being	 subject	 to	 a	 common	 fate	 or	 simply	 having	 face-to-face	 contact.	 For	 Bacharach,	 group
idenAty	 is	 a	 “framing	phenomenon”	 (2006,	p.	 81).	 To	group	 idenAfy	 is	 to	 conceive	of	oneself	 as	 a	 group
member:	to	represent	oneself	as	a	group	member	and	have	group	concepts	in	one's	frame.	Hence,	for	him,
all	 these	factors	that	trigger	group	 idenAty	may	cause	a	shio	from	the	“I	 frame”	to	a	“we	frame”	(see,	 in
parAcular,	Bacharach,	2006,	pp.	76-81).
Sugden	 (2003,	2011,	2015)	 takes	 the	 second	posiAon	described	above:	an	 individual	decision-maker	may
choose	to	endorse	team	reasoning,	but	there	is	no	basis	for	raAonal	evaluaAon	of	this	choice.	For	Sugden,
there	may	be	numerous	modes	of	valid	reasoning	and	an	individual	decision-maker	may	choose	to	endorse
any	 one	 of	 them,	 but	 none	 of	 these	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 are	 privileged	 over	 others	 on	 the	 basis	 of
instrumental	raAonality.	Instrumental	pracAcal	reasoning	allows	an	agent	to	infer	the	best	means	to	achieve
its	goals.	Therefore	instrumental	raAonality	must	presume	both	the	unit	of	decision-making	agency	as	well
as	 its	 goals	 and	neither	of	 these	are	 amenable	 to	evaluaAon	by	 the	 theory	of	 raAonality	 itself.	However,
Sugden	discusses	a	number	of	condiAons	that	may	need	to	be	saAsﬁed	in	order	for	an	individual	to	endorse
team	 reasoning.	He	 sees	 team	 reasoning	 as	 cooperaAon	 for	mutual	 advantage.	Hence	whether	 or	 not	 a
person	team	reasons	will	depend	on	whether	it	is	beneﬁcial	for	that	decision-maker	to	do	so	individually	(in
terms	of	his	or	her	individual	preferences	and	goals).4	Further,	team	play	by	a	parAcular	decision-maker	may
be	condiAonal	on	the	assurance	that	other	players	are	reasoning	as	members	of	a	team	as	well.
Sugden	can	sAll	accept	a	lot	of	what	Bacharach	says	about	the	circumstances	in	which	people	team	reason,
as	can	any	 theory	of	 team	reasoning	 (Gold,	2012).	Sugden's	agents	 sAll	need	 to	 conceive	 of	the	decision
problem	as	a	problem	for	the	team,	rather	than	as	a	problem	for	them	as	individuals,	before	they	can	team
4 To	understand	the	idea	of	mutual	beneﬁt	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	payoﬀ	numbers	associated	with	diﬀerent	
outcomes	in	games	are	meant	to	represent	the	interacAng	players'	preferences	that,	in	some	sense,	mirror	their	
goals	and	moAvaAons	in	these	games.	In	this	light,	higher	payoﬀ	values	represent	higher	levels	of	preference	
saAsfacAon.	This	interpretaAon	of	payoﬀs,	however,	causes	a	general	diﬃculty	in	experiments,	in	which	we	need	
to	assume	that	the	payoﬀs	presented	to	parAcipants	are	correctly	aligned	with	their	true	moAvaAons	and	
preferences.	If	games	used	in	experiments	are	incenAvized	using	monetary	payoﬀs,	for	example,	we	need	to	
assume	that	the	interacAng	parAcipants'	true	moAvaAons	are	aligned	with	the	maximizaAon	of	personal	monetary
payoﬀs.
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reason	 (Sugden,	 2000,	 pp .	182-183).	 The	diﬀerence	 is	 that,	 in	 Sugden's	 theory,	 people	make	 a	 choice	 to
team	reason	and	assurance	plays	a	part	 in	 this,	whereas	 for	Bacharach,	 team	reasoning	 is	 the	result	of	a
psychological	process	and	may	lead	team	reasoners	to	be	worse	oﬀ	than	they	would	have	been	if	they	had
reasoned	as	 individuals	 (for	 instance	 they	may	 cooperate	 in	 a	Prisoner's	Dilemma	when	 the	other	player
defects;	for	more	on	how	this	can	happen	see	Gold,	2012).
Bacharach	and	Sugden	agree	 that	all	 goals	are	 the	goals	of	agents	and	 that	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	evaluate
those	 goals	without	 ﬁrst	 specifying	 the	 unit	 of	 agency.	 Thus,	 even	 though	 Sugden	 allows	 for	 the	 unit	 of
agency	to	be	chosen,	it	is	not	a	maXer	of	instrumentally	raAonal	choice.	In	contrast,	Hurley	(2005a,	2005b)
suggests	that	there	is	no	need	to	idenAfy	the	unit	of	agency	with	the	source	of	evaluaAon	of	outcomes	and
that	we	can	idenAfy	personal	goals	prior	to	idenAfying	the	unit	of	agency.	Hurley	says	that,	“As	an	individual
I	can	recognise	that	a	collecAve	unit	of	which	I	am	merely	a	part	can	bring	about	outcomes	that	I	prefer	to
any	that	I	could	bring	about	by	acAng	as	an	individual	unit.”	(Hurley,	2005a,	p.	203).	Hence,	Hurley	suggests
that	principles	of	pracAcal	raAonality	can	govern	the	choice	of	the	unit	of	agency;	one	should	choose	the
unit	of	agency	that	best	realizes	one's	personal	goals.	If	that	unit	is	the	team,	then	one	should	team	reason
as	a	maXer	of	pracAcal	raAonality.5
The	problem	for	theories	that	allow	raAonal	choice	of	the	unit	of	agency	is	how	to	specify	the	goals	that	we
should	be	striving	for,	independent	of	the	unit	of	agency.	Hurley	suggests	that	we	should	privilege	personal
goals	 but,	 once	 we	 recognise	 that	 there	 are	 other	 possible	 units	 of	 agency	 (and	 evaluaAon),	 we	might
quesAon	why	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 the	 personal	 level	 takes	 priority.	For	 a	 decision-maker	 in	Regan's	 (1980)
theory	of	cooperaAve	uAlitarianism,	for	example,	the	goal	is	always	uAlitarian	and	the	quesAon	is	what	unit
of	 agency	one	 should	be	adopAng	given	 this	 goal.	However,	 taking	goals	 as	 given	 to	us	by	our	 theory	of
value,	or	moral	theory,	turns	team	reasoning	from	a	theory	of	raAonal	choice	into	a	theory	of	moral	choice,
which	is	not	intended	by	many	of	its	proponents.
The	 problem	 is	 brought	 out	 in	 recent	 work	 by	 Gauthier	 (2013).	 Gauthier	 has	 long	 held	 that	 it	 can	 be
instrumentally	 raAonal	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 game	 (Gauthier,	 1986).	 In	 a	 recent	 re-
working	 of	 his	 theory,	 Gauthier	 (2013)	 contrasts	 two	 opposed	 concepAons	 of	 deliberaAve	 raAonality:
maximizaAon	 (equivalent	 to	 individualisAc	best-response	 reasoning)	and	Pareto-opAmizaAon.	He	suggests
that	Pareto-opAmizaAon	is	a	necessary	condiAon	for	raAonality	in	mulA-player	games.	A	Pareto-opAmizing
theory	 “provides	 only	 a	 single	 set	 of	 direcAves	 to	 all	 the	 interacAng	 agents,	 with	 the	 direcAve	 to	 each
premised	on	the	acceptance	by	the	others	of	the	direcAves	to	them”	(Gauthier	2013,	p.	607).	The	outcome
selected	must	be	both	eﬃcient	and	fair	in	how	it	distributes	the	expected	gains	of	cooperaAon.	Although	he
does	not	explicitly	use	 the	 term	“team	 reasoning”,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	Gauthier's	 theory	 is	 similar	 to	 ideas	of
team	reasoning	for	mutual	gain.	His	jusAﬁcaAon	for	team	reasoning	is	that	it	would	pass	a	contractarian	test
whereby	 it	 is	 “eligible	 for	 inclusion	 in	an	actual	 society	 that	consAtutes	a	cooperaAve	venture	 for	mutual
fulﬁlment”	(Gauthier,	2013,	p.	618).
5 Hurley	(2005b)	follows	Kacelnick	(2006)	in	disAnguishing	two	concepAons	of	raAonality:	raAonality	as	consistent	
paXerns	of	behaviour	and	raAonality	as	processes	of	reasoning	that	underlie	that	behaviour.	Hurley	subscribes	to	
the	ﬁrst	concepAon,	therefore	the	processes	in	an	agent	that	actually	generate	his	or	her	raAonal	behaviour	need	
not	be	isomorphic	with	the	theoreAcal	account	of	why	the	behaviour	counts	as	raAonal.	Hence	she	invesAgates	
local	procedures	and	heurisAcs	from	which	collecAve	units	of	agency	can	emerge.	According	to	her	picture,	
choices	can	be	instrumentally	raAonal	even	if	they	result	from	a	crude,	low-level	heurisAc.
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As	Gauthier	(2013,	p.	624)	puts	 it,	his	goal	 is	to	show	that	“social	morality	 is	part	of	raAonal	choice,	or	at
least,	 integral	 to	 raAonal	 cooperaAon”.	However,	 whilst	 he	 has	 sketched	 out	 what	 Pareto-opAmizaAon
would	involve,	Gauthier	has	not	provided	any	argument	for	its	raAonality;	he	concludes	that	he	has	not	yet
been	successful	in	bridging	the	two	and	that	more	needs	to	be	done	regarding	the	connecAon	to	raAonality
(in	other	words,	how	 instrumental	 raAonality	may	require	us	 to	cooperate	 in	social	 interacAons).	But	 it	 is
hard	 to	 see	 how	Gauthier	 could	 bring	 Pareto-opAmizaAon	within	 instrumental	 raAonality.	 If	 he	 goes	 the
same	route	as	Hurley	and	privileges	the	individual's	perspecAve	and	goals,	then	he	needs	to	explain	why	it
is	 instrumentally	raAonal	 to	cooperate	when	the	 individual	could	do	beXer	by	deviaAng	 in	situaAons	that
have	the	double	crossing	feature.	Or,	if	the	idea	is	that	there	is	some	addiAon	to	instrumental	raAonality	for
choosing	the	level	of	agency,	then	it	is	hard	to	see	how	to	characterize	such	a	process.	A	reasoning	process
already	 seems	 to	presume	an	agent	who	 is	 doing	 the	 reasoning.	As	Bardsley	 (2001,	p.	 185)	puts	 it,	 “the
quesAon	 `should	 I	 ask	myself	 “what	 am	 I	 to	 do?”	 or	 “what	 are	we	 to	 do?”?'	 presupposes	 a	 ﬁrst	 person
singular	point	of	view”.
3.	What	Do	Teams	Strive	For?
We	 now	 turn	 to	 reviewing	diﬀerent	 proposals	 about	 a	 team's	 goals.	 The	 approaches	 presented	 diﬀer	 in
whether	 they	 require	 individual	 decision-makers	 to	 someAmes	 sacriﬁce	 their	 personal	 interests	 for	 the
beneﬁt	of	other	members	of	 a	 team	and	whether	 they	 rely	on	making	 interpersonal	 comparisons	of	 the
interacAng	players'	payoﬀs.	Bacharach	(2006)	menAons	Pareto	eﬃciency	as	a	minimal	condiAon,	i.e.,	that	if
a	strategy	proﬁle	 is	superior	 in	terms	of	Pareto	eﬃciency,	then	it	 is	preferred	by	the	team	to	the	strategy
proﬁles	that	it	is	superior	to.	The	exclusion	of	all	Pareto	ineﬃcient	strategy	proﬁles,	however,	says	nothing
about	how	a	team	should	rank	the	remaining	strategy	proﬁles	where	there	is	a	conﬂict	of	personal	interests,
such	as	presented	by	the	pair	of	outcomes	(C,	D)	and	(D,	C)	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game.
In	some	of	the	early	developments	of	the	theory,	e.g.,	Bacharach	(1999,	2006)	as	well	as	some	of	the	more
recent	papers,	e.g.,	Colman	et	al.	(2008,	2014)	and	Smerilli	(2012),	the	maximizaAon	of	the	average	of	the
interacAng	 players'	 payoﬀs	 is	 used	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	 team	 payoﬀ	 funcAon.	 This	 funcAon—that	 is,	 a
mathemaAcal	representaAon	of	a	team's	goals	in	an	interpersonal	interacAon—is	consistent	with	the	strong
interdependence	feature	and	the	related	Pareto	eﬃciency	criterion	discussed	in	the	previous	secAon,	and	it
is	easy	to	see	that	it	selects	the	outcomes	(Hi,	Hi)	and	(C,	C)	as	uniquely	best	for	a	team	in	the	Hi-Lo	and	in
the	above	Prisoner's	Dilemma	games	respecAvely.	(Speciﬁcally,	maximising	the	average	payoﬀ	will	select	(C,
C)	in	any	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	where	the	average	of	the	payoﬀs	from	(C,	C)	is	higher	than	the	average
from	 any	 other	 outcome.)	 This	 funcAon,	 however,	 someAmes	 fails	with	 respect	 to	 the	 noAon	 of	mutual
advantage.	 Consider	 a	 slight	 variaAon	 of	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 game	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 4.	 Here	 the
maximizaAon	 of	 the	 average	 of	 the	 two	 players'	 personal	 payoﬀs	would	 prescribe	 the	 aXainment	 of	 the
outcome	(D,	C).	As	such,	it	would	advocate	a	complete	sacriﬁce	of	the	column	player's	personal	interests	for
the	beneﬁt	of	the	row	player	alone.
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The	averaging	funcAon	also	relies	on	making	interpersonal	comparisons	of	the	interacAng	players'	payoﬀs,
which	suggests,	 for	example,	 that	 the	 row	player	prefers	 the	outcome	(D,	C)	 to	 (C,	C)	 to	a	greater	extent
than	the	column	player	prefers	the	outcome	(C,	D)	to	(D,	D)	in	Figure	4.	Strictly	speaking,	such	comparisons
go	beyond	the	orthodox	assumpAons	of	expected	uAlity	theory,	which	make	numerical	representaAons	of
the	 interacAng	 players'	 preferences	 possible	 but	 do	 not	 automaAcally	 grant	 their	 interpersonal
comparability.	As	such,	a	theory	of	team	reasoning	that	uses	this	funcAon	as	a	representaAon	of	a	team's
goals	is	only	applicable	in	contexts	when	such	interpersonal	comparisons	of	payoﬀs	are	possible.6
Although	not	many	alternaAve	funcAonal	representaAons	of	a	team's	goals	have	been	proposed	(perhaps
partly	because	many	works	on	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	have	so	far	considered	examples	where	team-
opAmal	outcomes	seem	evident,	 such	as	 the	outcomes	 (Hi,	Hi)	and	 (C,	C)	 in	 the	Hi-Lo	and	 the	Prisoner's
Dilemma	games),	a	number	of	properAes	that	representaAons	of	a	team's	goals	should	saAsfy	have	been
put	forward.	One	of	them	is	the	noAon	of	mutual	advantage	discussed	by	Sugden	(2011),	which	suggests
that	the	outcome	selected	by	a	team	should	be	mutually	beneﬁcial	from	every	team	member's	perspecAve.
Although	 he	 does	 not	 present	 an	 explicit	 funcAon	 of	 a	 team's	 goals,	 in	 a	 recent	 paper	 Sugden	 (2015)
proposes	 to	measure	mutual	 advantage	 relaAve	 to	 a	 parAcular	 threshold.	 The	 threshold	 is	 each	 player's
personal	maximin	 payoﬀ	 level	 in	 a	 game—the	 payoﬀ	 that	 he	 or	 she	 can	 guarantee	 him	 or	 herself
independently	of	 the	other	players'	chosen	strategies.	 In	 the	Hi-Lo	game	this	 is	0	 for	both	players.	 In	 the
Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	of	Figures	2	and	4,	this	is	1,	since	it	is	the	lowest	possible	payoﬀ	that	either	player
can	 aXain	 by	 playing	D.	 A	 strategy	 proﬁle	 is	 said	 to	 be	mutually	 beneﬁcial	 if	 (a)	 it	 results	 in	 each	player
receiving	 a	 payoﬀ	 that	 is	 greater	 than	 his	 or	 her	maximin	 payoﬀ	 level	 in	 a	 game,	 and	 (b)	 each	 player's
parAcipaAon	in	team	play	is	necessary	for	the	aXainment	of	those	payoﬀs.7
Karpus	 and	 Radzvilas	 (2016)	 propose	 a	 formal	 funcAon	 of	 a	 team's	 goals	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	 noAon	 of
mutual	 advantage	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 above	whilst	 also	 incorporaAng	 the	 Pareto	 eﬃciency	 criterion	 (in	 a
weak	 sense	 of	 Pareto	 eﬃciency,	 which	 means	 that	 an	 outcome	 of	 a	 game	 is	 eﬃcient	 if	 there	 is	 no
alternaAve	that	 is	strictly	preferred	to	 it	by	every	player	 in	the	game).	 It	suggests	that	an	outcome	that	 is
opAmal	 for	 a	 team	 is	 one	 that	 is	 associated	with	 the	maximal	 amount	 of	mutual	 beneﬁt.	 The	 extent	 of
6 If	the	numbers	in	game	matrices,	for	example,	represent	monetary	payoﬀs	and	all	players	value	money	in	the	
same	way	(that	is,	an	addiAonal	unit	of	currency	is	subjecAvely	worth	just	as	much	to	one	player	as	it	is	to	
another),	then	interpersonal	comparisons	of	payoﬀs	are	not	problemaAc.	If,	however,	the	payoﬀ	numbers	in	
games	represent	players'	personal	moAvaAons	as	von	Neumann-Morgenstern	uAliAes,	then	such	comparisons	are	
tricky.
7 Note	that	according	to	the	above	deﬁniAon,	both	(Lo,	Lo)	and	(Hi,	Hi)	are	mutually	beneﬁcial	outcomes	in	the	Hi-Lo
game,	since	even	(Lo,	Lo)	guarantees	both	players	more	than	their	maximin	payoﬀ.	Hence,	the	deﬁniAon	of	mutual
advantage	does	not,	by	itself,	exclude	Pareto	ineﬃcient	outcomes	and,	for	Sugden	(2015),	which	of	the	mutually	
beneﬁcial	outcomes	will	be	sought	by	a	team	depends	on	which	outcome	each	player	in	a	game	will	have	
“reciprocal	reason	to	believe”	will	be	sought	by	every	other	player.	See	also	CubiX	and	Sugden	(2003)	for	more	
details	on	“reason	to	believe”,	which	is	based	on	a	reconstrucAon	of	Lewis'	(1969)	game	theory.
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Figure	4:	A	variaAon	of	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma
game
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mutual	beneﬁt	 is	measured	by	 the	number	of	payoﬀ	units	by	which	an	outcome	advances	every	player's
personal	interests	relaAve	to	some	threshold	points,	such	as	the	players'	maximin	payoﬀ	levels	in	games	as
suggested	by	Sugden	(2015).	For	example,	if	both	players'	maximin	payoﬀs	(in	a	two-player	game)	are	0,	an
outcome	associated	with	a	payoﬀ	of	3	to	Player	1	and	payoﬀ	of	2	to	Player	2	oﬀers	2	units	of	mutual	beneﬁt
(the	 addiAonal	 unit	 of	 individual	 beneﬁt	 to	 Player	 1	 is	 not	mutual).8	 As	 such,	 the	 funcAon	 idenAﬁes	 the
outcome	 (Hi,	Hi)	 as	uniquely	opAmal	 for	 a	 team	 in	 the	Hi-Lo	game	and	prescribes	 the	aXainment	of	 the
outcome	(C,	C)	in	all	the	versions	of	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	discussed	above.9
II.	Evidence
4.	The	Diﬃcul7es	of	Empirical	Tes7ng
There	 is	a	major	diﬃculty	that	any	empirical	 test	of	 team	reasoning	will	unavoidably	 face:	 the	fact	 that	a
number	 of	 separate	 hypotheses	 are	 being	 tested	 at	 once.	 The	main	 hypothesis	 to	 be	 tested	 is	 whether
people	 reason	 as	 members	 of	 a	 team	 in	 a	 parAcular	 situaAon.	 This,	 however,	 is	 intertwined	 with	 two
addiAonal	auxiliary	hypotheses.	The	ﬁrst	is	whether	the	parAcular	situaAon	at	hand	is	one	in	which	people
might	reason	as	members	of	a	team	in	general,	and	the	second	is	whether	the	experimenter	has	correctly
speciﬁed	 the	goals	 that	 the	members	of	 the	 team	 try	 to	achieve.	 These	may	 involve	assuming	parAcular
answers	 to	 the	“when	do	people	reason	as	members	of	a	team?”	and	the	“what	do	people	do	when	they
reason	as	members	of	a	team?”	quesAons	that	we	idenAﬁed	above.	Also,	if	decision-makers	do	not	follow
individualisAc	 best-response	 reasoning	 in	 certain	 situaAons,	 we	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 disAnguish	 team
reasoning	 from	 other	 possible	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 that	 they	 may	 choose	 to	 endorse,	 e.g.,	 regret
minimizaAon	or	ambiguity	aversion,	or	from	factors	that	inﬂuence	decisions,	like	risk	aversion.	
Despite	 these	 diﬃculAes,	 a	 number	 of	 relaAvely	 recent	 empirical	 studies	 have	 been	 carried	 out	 in	 an
aXempt	to	 test	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning.	Since	the	aim	 is	 to	 test	 the	theory	of	 team	reasoning	tout
court,	the	experiments	use	situaAons	where	it	is	naturally	invoked	as	an	explanaAon	of	actual	play. They	can
be	 broadly	 divided	 into	 two	 groups:	 those	 that	 focus	 on	 team	 reasoning	 where	 it	 resolves	 a	 Nash
equilibrium	 selecAon	problem	 (coordinaAon	problems)	 and	 those	 that	 focus	on	 team	 reasoning	where	 it
selects	outcomes	that	are	not	Nash	equilibria	(as	in	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma).	We	will	review	both	types	of
studies	 in	 turn.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	 piqng	 team	 reasoning	 against	 other	 explanaAons	 of	 coordinaAon	 and
cooperaAon	in	these	games,		so	experimenters	hope	that	the	outcome	that	they	idenAfy	as	the	team	goal	is
uncontroversial,	although	we	will	see	that	someAmes	there	is	room	for	dispute.	
5.	Tests	Based	on	Nash	Equilibrium	Selec7on
8 In	Karpus	and	Radzvilas'	funcAon	payoﬀs	are	ﬁrst	normalized	so	that,	for	each	player,	the	least	and	the	most	
preferred	outcomes	in	a	game	are	associated	with	payoﬀ	values	0	and	100	respecAvely.	
9 There	is	a	connecAon	between	the	noAon	of	mutual	beneﬁt	in	team	play	and	Gauthier's	(2013)	idea	of	raAonal	
cooperaAon	discussed	earlier.	For	Gauthier,	raAonal	cooperaAon	is	aXained	by	maximizing	the	minimum	level	of	
personal	gains	across	players	relaAve	to	threshold	points	beyond	which	individuals	would	not	cooperate.	This	is	
similar	to	the	way	the	maximally	mutually	beneﬁcial	outcomes	are	idenAﬁed	using	the	funcAon	of	team's	goals	
presented	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas	(2016).	Gauthier,	however,	does	not	provide	a	clear	characterizaAon	of	what	
the	aforemenAoned	threshold	points	are	and	his	jusAﬁcaAon	for	raAonal	cooperaAon	is	based	on	the	idea	of	
“social	morality”	(see	earlier	discussion	in	SecAon	2)	rather	than	the	interacAng	players	aXempAng	to	resolve	
games	in	mutually	advantageous	ways.
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The	 ﬁrst	 category	 of	 experiments	 involves	 games	 with	 mulAple	 Nash	 equilibria	 where	 non-equilibrium
outcomes	yield	no	payoﬀs	to	the	interacAng	players.	As	such,	they	are	Nash	equilibrium	coordinaAon	games
in	which	players	try	to	coordinate	their	acAons	on	one	of	the	available	equilibria	in	order	to	aXain	posiAve
payoﬀs.	 Team	 reasoning	 is	 said	 to	 single	 out	 one	of	 the	 equilibria	 as	 uniquely	 opAmal	 for	 a	 team	and	 is
tested	against	other	possible	modes	of	reasoning	that	may	be	at	play.	The	dominant	alternaAve	explanaAon
of	 behaviour	 in	 these	 experiments	 (to	 that	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 team	 reasoning)	 is	assumed	 to	 be	 cogniAve
hierarchy	 theory,	which	posits	 the	existence	of	 individualisAc	best-response	 reasoners	who	diﬀer	 in	 their
beliefs	 about	 what	 other	 players	 are	 going	 to	 do	 in	 games.	 The	 level-0	 decision-makers	 are	 said	 not	 to
reason	much	at	all	when	playing	games	and	choose	any	of	the	available	opAons	at	random,	 i.e.	they	play
each	available	opAon	with	equal	probability.10	The	level-1	reasoners	assume	everybody	else	to	be	cogniAve
level-0	and	best-respond	to	the	level-0	decision-makers'	strategy.	The	level-2	reasoners	assume	everybody
else	to	be	cogniAve	level-1	and,	similarly,	best-respond	to	the	expected	strategies	of	a	level-1	player,	and	so
on	 for	 higher	 level	 cogniAve	 types.	 Although	 in	 principle	 the	 cogniAve	 hierarchy	 theory	 allows	 for	 any
number	 of	 cogniAve	 types	 (where	 each	 type	 assumes	 other	 players	 to	 be	 of	 one	 level	 lesser	 type	 than
themselves),	in	pracAce	it	is	usually	assumed	that	most	decision-makers	are	level-1	or	level-2	reasoners.
Bardsley	et	 al.	 (2010)	 conducted	a	 similar	experiment	at	 two	 separate	 locaAons—one	 in	Amsterdam	and
one	 in	Noqngham—using	 a	 set	 of	Nash	equilibrium	coordinaAon	games	described	above.	An	example	 is
given	 in	Figure	5.	 In	 this	game,	the	best	response	to	a	player	who	chooses	any	of	 the	opAons	with	equal
probability	 is	 to	pick	one	of	 the	opAons	associated	with	the	payoﬀ	of	10.	This	 is	because	somebody	who
chooses	at	random	is	expected	to	play	each	of	the	four	available	strategies	with	equal	probability	of	¼.	As
such,	the	expected	payoﬀ	from	choosing	A,	B	 or	C	(when	the	co-player	chooses	at	random)	is	10	x	¼	=	2.5
while	the	expected	payoﬀ	from	choosing	D	is	9	x	¼	=	2.25.	Therefore,	a	level-1	reasoner	would	never	choose
D.	From	this	it	follows	that	level-2	reasoners	would	never	choose	D	either,	since	they	are	best-responding	to
the	choice	of	level-1	types,	and	would,	hence,	also	pick	one	of	the	opAons	associated	with	the	payoﬀ	of	10.
Bardsley	et	al.	 (2010)	hypothesized	that	team	reasoners	would	choose	opAon	D	due	to	the	uniqueness	of
the	outcome	(D,	D)	and	the	indisAnguishability	of	the	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	and	(C,	C),	which	allows	players
to	easily	coordinate	their	acAons.	In	the	experiment,	games	were	not	presented	to	parAcipants	in	the	form
of	a	matrix	as	shown	in	Figure	5	and	there	was	no	way	to	disAnguish	between	the	available	strategies	and
10 This	is	assumed	in	the	most	frequently	occurring	version	of	the	cogniAve	hierarchy	theory.	For	a	sightly	diﬀerent	
version,	where	level-0	decision-makers	randomize	between	all	of	the	available	opAons,	but	assign	slightly	higher	
probability	to	the	play	of	the	strategy	associated	with	the	highest	personal	payoﬀ	or	that	with	the	most	salient	
label,	see,	for	example,	Crawford	et	al.	(2008).
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A B C D
A 10,	10 0,	0 0,	0 0,	0
B 0,	0 10,	10 0,	0 0,	0
C 0,	0 0,	0 10,	10 0,	0
D 0,	0 0,	0 0,	0 9,	9
Figure	5:	An	example	of	a	game	from	the
Amsterdam	experiment	in	the	form	of	a	game
matrix
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outcomes	 other	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 payoﬀs	 that	 the	 players	 would	 aXain	 if	 they	managed	 to	 successfully
coordinate	their	choices.	For	example,	the	outcome	(A,	A)	could	not	be	idenAﬁed	as	being	unique	due	to	its
top-leo	 posiAon	 in	 the	matrix	 or	 because	 of	 being	 associated	with	 choice	 opAons	 labelled	with	 the	 ﬁrst
leXer	of	alphabet.	NoAce	that	(D,	D)	is	not	Pareto	eﬃcient:	it	is	inferior	to	the	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	and	(C,
C).	The	reasoning	behind	the	suggesAon	that	team-reasoning	decision-makers	would	opt	for	the	outcome
(D,	D)	is	that,	in	the	case	of	the	three	indisAnguishable	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	and	(C,	C),	a	player	can	only
“pick”	one	of	them	and	hope	that	the	other	player	would	“pick”	the	same	one,	whereas	in	the	case	of	the
outcome	 (D,	D),	 a	 player	 is	 “choosing”	 the	 corresponding	 strategy	D	 because	 of	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 that
outcome.	If	both	players	pick	one	of	the	three	indisAnguishable	outcomes,	there	is	a	⅓	chance	that	they	will
pick	the	same	one,	whereas	if	they	both	choose	strategy	D,	they	can	be	sure	of	aXaining	the	outcome	(D,
D).	So	the	expected	payoﬀ	from	trying	to	coordinate	on	one	of	the	outcomes	(A,	A),	 (B,	B)	or	 (C,	C)	 for	a
team-reasoning	decision-maker	is	3⅓	while	the	certain	payoﬀ	from	coordinaAng	on	the	outcome	(D,	D)	is	9.
(See	Gold	and	Sugden's	 introducAon	to	Bacharach	(2006)	for	more	on	this	 idea.)	To	put	this	diﬀerently,	 it
may	 be	 said	 that	ex	 ante,	 before	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 other	 player's	 acAon	 is	 resolved	 and	 when
players	take	into	account	the	likelihood	of	coordinaAng	their	acAons	in	the	computaAon	of	their	expected
payoﬀs,	 the	 opAmal	 outcome	 in	 terms	 of	 Pareto	 eﬃciency	 is	 (D,	D).	 Ex	 post,	 once	 the	 game	 has	 been
played,	the	three	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	and	(C,	C)	Pareto	dominate	(D,	D).11
The	 experimental	 results,	 though	 showing	 a	 clear	 deviaAon	 from	 individualisAc	 best-response	 reasoning
(assuming	 that	 it	 would	 not	 discriminate	 among	 the	 available	 Nash	 equilibria),	 are	 diﬀerent	 in	 the
Amsterdam	and	the	Noqngham	experiments.	The	results	from	Amsterdam	seem	to	suggest	the	presence	of
team	 reasoning	 rather	 than	 cogniAve	 hierarchy	 reasoning,	whereas	 the	 results	 from	Noqngham	 tend	 to
suggest	 the	 opposite.	 In	 addiAon	 to	 making	 choices	 in	 numerical	 coordinaAon	 games,	 such	 as	 the	 one
illustrated	above,	both	experiments	asked	 the	parAcipants	 to	complete	other	non-numerical	 “text”	 tasks.
These	diﬀered	between	the	two	experiments	and	the	authors	speculate	that	there	may	have	been	spillover
eﬀects	 from	 the	 text	 tasks	 on	 the	 modes	 of	 reasoning	 used	in	 the	 numerical	 coordinaAon	 tasks.	 In
Amsterdam,	text	tasks	involved	picking	the	odd	one	out,	so	parAcipants	may	have	tended	to	pick	strategies
that	were	associated	with	outcomes	appearing	as	odd	ones	out	in	the	number	tasks,	while	in	Noqngham
text	 tasks	gave	more	scope	 for	picking	 favourites,	 so	parAcipants	may	have	tended	to	focus	on	outcomes
that	were	associated	with	their	favourite	payoﬀs.
Another	pair	of	experiments	that	focus	on	the	Nash	equilibrium	selecAon	problem	was	carried	out	by	Faillo
et	al.	(2013,	2016).	Both	experiments	presented	the	parAcipants	with	two-player	games,	in	which	they	had
to	pick	one	of	three	opAons	presented	as	segments	of	a	pie.	See	Figure	6	for	an	example.	Upon	successfully
coordinaAng	on	one	of	the	three	pie	segments	parAcipants	received	posiAve	payoﬀs,	though	these	were	not
always	the	same	for	the	two	players.	In	the	game	of	Figure	6,	 if	we	call	the	top	leo	slice	R1,	the	top	right
slice	R2,	and	the	boXom	slice	R3,	then	the	outcomes	(R1,	R1),	(R2,	R2)	and	(R3,	R3)	yielded	pairs	of	payoﬀs
(9,	10),	(10,	9)	and	(9,	9)	to	the	two	players	respecAvely.	A	representaAon	of	this	game	using	a	game	matrix
is	given	in	Figure	7.
11 Note	that	this	idea	is	based	on	an	implicit	assumpAon	that	decision-makers	are	not	extremely	risk-loving.	If	the	
interacAng	decision-makers	both	preferred	the	⅓	chance	of	receiving	a	payoﬀ	of	10	to	a	certainty	of	the	payoﬀ	of	9
(i.e.,	if	they	both	were	extremely	risk-seeking),	then	the	team-opAmal	choice	may	be	to	pick	one	of	A,	B,	or	C	in	
the	hope	of	coordinaAng	on	one	of	the	outcomes	(A,	A),	(B,	B)	or	(C,	C)	respecAvely.
11
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Like	the	experiments	of	Bardsley	et	al.	(2010),	these	experiments	were	designed	to	pit	the	theory	of	team
reasoning	 against	 cogniAve	 hierarchy	 theory.	 Faillo	 et	 al.	 (2013,	 2016)	 also	 followed	 Bardsley	 et	 al.	 in
hypothesizing	that	team	reasoners	would	take	into	account	the	probability	of	successful	coordinaAon	when
working	out	the	expected	payoﬀs	associated	with	the	available	opAons.	Pairs	of	Nash	equilibria	counted	as
indisAnguishable	from	the	perspecAve	of	team	reasoning	when	they	were	symmetric	in	terms	of	payoﬀs	to
the	 two	 players,	 such	 as	 the	 pair	 of	 outcomes	 (R1,	R1)	 and	 (R2,	R2)	 in	 the	 above	 example.	 In	 fact,	 the
outcomes	(R1,	R1)	and	(R2,	R2)	were	 indisAnguishable	 in	all	games	 in	the	two	experiments	and	the	team
opAmal	choice	was	always	associated	with	the	aXainment	of	the	outcome	(R3,	R3).	(The	 labels	R1,	R2	and
R3	 were	 hidden	 from	 parAcipants	 and	 the	 posiAons	 of	 pie	 slices	 were	 varied	 across	 three	 diﬀerent
treatment	groups.	The	staAsAcal	analysis	of	results	showed	no	signiﬁcant	eﬀects	of	pie	slice	posiAons	on	the
choice	of	R3	versus	R1	or	R2.)
Table	1	summarizes	the	results	of	Faillo	et	al.	(2013).12	Team	reasoning	is	a	good	predictor	in	7	out	of	the	11
games,	 where	 the	modal	 choice	 was	 the	 opAon	R3.	 The	 observed	 choices	 in	 the	 remaining	 4	 games	 (in
addiAon	to	3	of	the	games	in	which	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	is	a	good	predictor)	can	be	explained	by
cogniAve	hierarchy	theory.13	As	such,	the	results	of	the	experiment	are	somewhat	mixed.	Faillo	et	al.	(2013)
conclude	that	team	reasoning	fails	when	it	predicts	the	choice	of	a	slice	that	is	ex	post	Pareto	dominated	by
12 The	type	of	pie	games	used	and	the	conclusions	drawn	in	the	two	experiments	are	quite	similar.	We	here	focus	on	
the	results	reported	in	the	ﬁrst	study.
13 For	example,	in	the	game	G3	the	cogniAve	hierarchy	theory	predicts	level-1	reasoners	will	play	the	strategy	
associated	with	the	highest	personal	payoﬀ.	This	is	the	opAon	R1	for	the	player	who	receives	the	payoﬀ	of	10	from	
the	outcome	(R1,	R1)	and	the	opAon	R2	for	the	player	who	receives	the	payoﬀ	of	10	from	the	outcome	(R2,	R2).	
Thus,	the	level-2	reasoners'	best	response	strategies	to	the	choices	of	level-1	types	will	be	a	mixture	of	opAons	R1	
and	R2,	depending	on	which	player	they	are.	As	a	result,	the	cogniAve	hierarchy	theory	predicts	a	mixture	of	R1	
and	R2	choices	with	no	play	of	R3.
12
R1 R2 R3
R1 9,	10 0,	0 0,	0
R2 0,	0 10,	9 0,	0
R3 0,	0 0,	0 9,	9
Figure	7:	An	example	of	a	3x3	pie	game	in	the
form	of	a	game	matrix
Figure	6:	An	example	of	a	3x3	pie	game	as	seen	by	two	interacAng	players
You get 10,
the other gets 9
You get 9,
the other gets 9
You get 9,
the other gets 10
You get 9,
the other gets 10
You get 9,
the other gets 9
You get 10,
the other gets 9
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the	other	two	and	this	is	not	compensated	by	greater	equality	(games	G3,	G5,	and	G7)	as	well	as	when	the
team-opAmal	 outcome	 yields	 less	 equal	 payoﬀs	 than	 the	 other	 opAons	 and	 this	 is	 not	 compensated	 by
Pareto	superiority	(G10).	They	suggest	that	we	need	a	more	general	theory	of	team	reasoning	and	oﬀer	two
ways	in	which	the	theory	could	be	amended	to	explain	their	results.	One	is	to	incorporate	the	circumstances
of	group	idenAﬁcaAon	(one	of	the	auxiliary	hypotheses	in	any	test	of	team	reasoning,	as	explained	above).
Ex	post	Pareto	dominance	and	equality	may	play	an	important	role	in	group	idenAﬁcaAon,	in	which	case	ex
ante	Pareto	dominance	will	not	be	suﬃcient	to	trigger	team	reasoning	by	itself.	The	other	is	to	accept	that
people	 may	 not	 achieve	 the	 level	 of	 reasoning	 “sophisAcaAon”	 that	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 idenAfy	 the
opAmality	of	the	ex	ante	Pareto	eﬃciency.	“Naive”	team	reasoners	may	want	to	pursue	the	group	interest
but,	because	 they	do	not	 idenAfy	 the	uniqueness	of	 the	outcome	 (R3,	R3),	 they	only	use	ex	post	Pareto
eﬃciency	and	equality	of	payoﬀs	(when	it	is	not	dominated	in	terms	of	Pareto	eﬃciency)	when	determining
what	the	group	should	do.
Although	the	aim	of	this	experiment	was	not	to	test	the	claim	that	game	harmony	predicts	team	reasoning,
it	is	clear	that	the	results	do	not	support	that	idea.	Whilst	there	is	a	high	level	of	team	reasoning	in	game
G6,	which	 has	 perfect	 alignment	 of	 payoﬀs,	G5	 also	 has	 perfect	 alignment	 of	 payoﬀs	 but	 relaAvely	 liXle
team	 reasoning.	 In	 contrast,	 G4	 and	 G9	 have	 lower	 levels	 of	 payoﬀ	 alignment	 but	 high	 levels	 of	 team
reasoning.	So	the	predicAons	that	payoﬀ	alignment	 leads	 to	 team	reasoning	and	payoﬀ	conﬂicts	miAgate
team	reasoning	is	not	supported	by	this	set	of	games.
There	is	another	way	to	explain	the	results	of	Faillo	et	al.	(2013),	which	challenges	their	assumpAon	about
what	the	team	takes	as	 its	goals.	Suppose	that	team-reasoning	decision-makers	ﬁrst	establish	the	opAmal
outcomes	 from	 the	 perspecAve	 of	 the	 team	 by	 idenAfying	 those	 outcomes	 that	maximize	 the	 extent	 of
mutual	advantage	as	suggested	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas	(2016).	These	outcomes	are	always	eﬃcient	in	the
weak	sense	of	Pareto	eﬃciency.	(Recall	that	an	outcome	of	a	game	is	said	to	be	Pareto	eﬃcient	in	the	weak
sense	 of	 Pareto	 eﬃciency,	 if	 there	 is	 no	 alternaAve	 that	 is	 strictly	 preferred	 to	 it	 by	 every	 player	 in	 the
13
Game
Payoﬀs Results,	%
(R1,	R1) (R2,	R2) (R3,	R3) R1 R2 R3
G1 (9,	10) (10,	9) (9,	9) CH	14%	TR CH	11%	TR CH	74%	TR
G2 (9,	10) (10,	9) (11,	11) CH	0%	TR CH	1%	TR CH	99%	TR
G3 (9,	10) (10,	9) (9,	8) CH	51%	TR CH	45%	TR CH	4%	TR
G4 (9,	10) (10,	9) (11,	10) CH	16%	TR CH	4%	TR CH	80%	TR
G5 (10,	10) (10,	10) (9,	9) CH	48%	TR CH	34%	TR CH	18%	TR
G6 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	11) CH	1%	TR CH	3%	TR CH	96%	TR
G7 (10,	10) (10,	10) (9,	8) CH	51%	TR CH	31%	TR CH	18%	TR
G8 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	10) CH	26%	TR CH	22%	TR CH	52%	TR
G9 (9,	12) (12,	9) (10,	11) CH	16%	TR CH	11%	TR CH	73%	TR
G10 (10,	10) (10,	10) (11,	9) CH	43%	TR CH	27%	TR CH	30%	TR
G11 (9,	11) (11,	9) (10,	10) CH	6%	TR CH	7%	TR CH	86%	TR
Table	1:	Summary	of	Faillo	et	al.	(2013)	results,	showing	the	percentage	of	subjects	making	each
choice	in	each	game;		in	all	games,	team	reasoning	is	assumed	to	predict	the	choice	of	R3
(highlighted	in	grey);	choices	predicted	by	cogniAve	hierarchy	theory	are	indicated	by	CH
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game.)	The	players	then	seek	ways	to	coordinate	their	acAons	on	one	of	the	outcomes	in	the	idenAﬁed	set
using	 unique	 features	 of	 some	 outcome	 (if	 an	 outcome	 with	 unique	 features	 exists)	 as	 a	 possible
coordinaAng	device.	This	approach	could	explain	choices	observed	in	games	G3,	G5	and	G7	in	addiAon	to
the	7	explained	originally.14	For	example,	 in	 the	game	G5,	 the	outcomes	 (R1,	R1)	and	 (R2,	R2)	are	strictly
preferred	to	the	outcome	(R3,	R3)	by	both	players	and,	hence,	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas's	approach,	they	are
deemed	opAmal	from	the	perspecAve	of	the	team.	Since	there	is	no	further	way	to	discriminate	between
the	laXer	two	outcomes,	team-reasoning	decision-makers,	according	to	this	interpretaAon,	end	up	playing	a
mixture	of	the	two.	In	the	game	G1,	on	the	other	hand,	none	of	the	three	equilibria	can	be	excluded	from
the	 set	 of	 team-opAmal	 outcomes,	 since	 they	 all	 provide	 the	 same	 extent	 of	mutual	 beneﬁt	 to	 the	 two
players.	 The	 outcome	 (R3,	 R3),	 however,	 is	 unique	 in	 this	 set	 and	 team-reasoning	 decision-makers,
therefore,	opt	for	this	outcome.
6.	Tests	Involving	Non-Nash	Equilibrium	Play
We	 now	 turn	 to	 tests	 of	 team	 reasoning	 where	 a	 team	 selects	 outcomes	 that	 are	 not	 Nash	 equilibria.
Although	 any	 empirical	 study	 of	 games	 in	which	 team	 reasoning	 prescribes	 non-equilibrium	play	 can	 be
seen	as	a	test	of	the	theory	(e.g.,	any	test	 involving	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game)	reviewing	all	historical
studies	of	games	of	this	type	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	 Instead,	we	will	 focus	on	two	relaAvely
recent	experiments	that	speciﬁcally	refer	to	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	in	their	hypotheses.
Colman	et	al.	(2008)	conducted	an	experiment	(Experiment	2	in	their	paper)	with	ﬁve	one-shot,	3x3,	two-
player	games	with	symmetric	payoﬀs	(i.e.,	each	game	was	played	once,	there	were	three	strategies	available
to	 each	 player	 and	 the	 payoﬀs	 to	 the	 two	 players	 were	 symmetric).	 All	 games	 had	 a	 unique	 Nash
equilibrium	and	a	unique	non-equilibrium	outcome	that	was	opAmal	from	the	perspecAve	of	a	team.	The
study	 assumed	 team	 play	 to	 be	 the	 maximizaAon	 of	 the	 average	 of	 players'	 payoﬀs.	 The	 predicted
outcomes,	however,	would	be	the	same	using	any	of	the	accounts	of	a	team's	goals	discussed	in	SecAon	3
above.	An	example	of	one	of	 their	 games	 is	 given	 in	Figure	8,	where	 the	unique	Nash	equilibrium	 is	 the
outcome	(E,	E)	and	the	opAmal	outcome	for	a	team	is	(C,	C).
The	results	of	the	experiment	show	that	in	four	games	(out	of	ﬁve)	slightly	more	than	half	of	parAcipants
chose	strategies	that	were	associated	with	the	team-opAmal	outcome	and	in	one	of	the	games	this	share
was	higher	(86%).	An	important	feature	of	all	games	in	the	experiment	was	that	the	team-opAmal	outcome
was	 superior	 to	 the	Nash	 equilibrium	 in	 terms	 of	 Pareto	 eﬃciency	 (which	makes	 these	 cases	 somewhat
similar	 to	 the	 Prisoner's	 Dilemma	 game).	 This	 may	 suggest	 that	 in	 cases	 of	 one-shot	 interacAons	 with
unique	Nash	equilibria	that	are	not	Pareto	eﬃcient	about	half	of	decision-makers	reason	as	members	of	a
14 In	the	game	G10	this	approach	establishes	team-opAmal	outcomes	to	be	(R1,	R1)	and	(R2,	R2),	thus	predicAng	no	
play	of	(R3,	R3).
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C D E
C 8,	8 5,	9 5,	5
D 9,	5 7,	7 5,	9
E 5,	5 9,	5 6,	6
Figure	8:	An	example	of	a	3x3	game	form
Colman	et	al.	(2008)
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team	and	play	accordingly.
In	a	diﬀerent	experiment,	Colman	et	al.	(2014)	used	another	set	of	eight	one-shot,	3x3	and	four	4x4,	two-
player	 games	 where	 every	 game	 (with	 the	 excepAon	 of	 one)	 contained	 a	 unique	 Nash	 equilibrium	 and
disAnct	but	also	unique	non-equilibrium	predicAons	based	on	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	and	cogniAve
hierarchy	theory.15	Examples	of	the	games	are	given	in	Figures	9	and	10.
The	study	assumed	team	play	to	be	associated	with	the	maximizaAon	of	the	average	of	players'	payoﬀs	(the
corresponding	 outcomes	 are	 indicated	 in	 bold	 in	 Figures	 9	 and	 10).	 Sugden's	 (2015)	 noAon	 of	 mutual
beneﬁt	 (see	SecAon	3	above)	and	 the	 funcAon	of	 team's	 goals	discussed	by	Karpus	and	Radzvilas	 (2016)
would	yield	diﬀerent	predicAons	in	some	of	these	games	(for	example,	in	Figure	9	the	opAmal	outcome	for
the	team	based	on	the	noAon	of	maximal	mutual	advantage	would	be	the	outcome	(A,	A)).	The	results	of
the	experiment	are	mixed,	with	at	 least	 two	out	of	 three	or	 three	out	of	 four	available	 strategies	played
quite	 frequently.	 This,	 combined	with	 uncertainty	 about	which	 outcome	 is	 the	 team	 reasoning	 soluAon,
makes	it	diﬃcult	to	idenAfy	which	mode	of	reasoning	predominates.
Furthermore,	many	of	 these	results	could	be	explained	by	a	combinaAon	of	level-0	and	level-1	reasoning,
which	simply	corresponds	to	random	picking	and	best-responding	to	a	random	choice	of	the	other	player
(also	see	Sugden,	2008,	who	suggests	that	these	results	would	be	obtained	with	a	populaAon	consisAng	of
50%	 team-reasoners,	 40%	 level-1	 and	 10%	 level-0	 types).	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 increasing	 the
diﬃculty	of	a	 task	 increases	 the	amount	of	 randomizing	 (Bardsley	and	Ule,	2014).16	Since	 the	games	 that
Colman	et	al.	(2014)	used	had	numerous	strategies	and	non-symmetric	variable	payoﬀs,	and	appear	to	be
quite	complex	and	cogniAvely	demanding	in	the	idenAﬁcaAon	of	raAonal	outcomes,	random	picking	and	the
principle	 of	 insuﬃcient	 reason	 (which	means	 best-responding	 to	 a	 random	 choice)	may	 provide	 a	 good
explanaAon	of	the	actual	choices.	
Conclusion	and	Further	Direc7ons
In	this	chapter	we	reviewed	some	of	the	recent	developments	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	in	games.
Since	 its	 early	 developments,	 which	 were	 triggered	 by	 orthodox	 game	 theory's	 inability	 to	 deﬁniAvely
resolve	certain	types	of	games	with	mulAple	Nash	equilibria	 (such	as	the	Hi-Lo	game)	and	explain	out-of-
15 The	study	also	refers	to	a	mode	of	reasoning	called	the	strong	Stackelberg	reasoning,	but,	since	the	laXer	always	
predicts	the	play	of	a	Nash	equilibrium,	in	all	(but	one)	of	the	studied	cases	it	is	indisAnguishable	from	
individualisAc	best-responding.
16 Bardsley	and	Ule	(2014)	test	for	team	reasoning	vs.	cogniAve	hierarchy	and	the	principle	of	insuﬃcient	reason	in	a	
'risky'	coordinaAon	game,	where	players	may	experience	losses	as	well	as	gains.	Their	results	favour	team	
reasoning.	(We	learned	of	this	paper	too	late	to	review	it	in	detail	in	this	chapter.)
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A B C
A 3,	3 1,	1 0,	2
B 1,	1 1,	4 3,	0
C 0,	0 2,	1 2,	5
Figure	9:	An	example	of	a	3x3	game	from
Colman	et	al.	(2014)
A B C D
A 4,	4 2,	0 3,	2 1,	5
B 2,	2 3,	3 2,	2 2,	0
C 4,	3 2,	4 2,	5 3,	2
D 5,	2 0,	3 0,	0 1,	1
Figure	10:	An	example	of	a	4x4	game	from
Colman	et	al.	(2014)
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equilibrium	play	in	others	(such	as	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game),	the	theory	has	advanced	in	a	number	of
diﬀerent	 direcAons.	 From	 the	 theoreAcal	 point	 of	 view,	 diﬀerent	 answers	 were	 proposed	 to	 the	 two
fundamental	quesAons	 that	 the	 theory	of	 team	 reasoning	needs	 to	address:	 “when	do	people	 reason	as
members	of	a	team?”	and	“what	is	it	that	they	do	when	they	reason	in	this	way?”.	In	response	to	the	ﬁrst
quesAon,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	mode	of	reasoning	that	an	individual	decision-maker	adopts	may
depend	 on	 that	 decision-maker's	 psychological	 make-up,	 it	 may	 be	 endorsed	 by	 the	 decision-maker
depending	 on	 a	 number	 of	 condiAons	 that	 need	 to	 be	 saAsﬁed,	 such	 as	 the	 assurance	 of	 others'
parAcipaAon	 in	team	play	and	the	noAon	of	mutual	beneﬁt,	or	 it	may	be	a	result	of	raAonal	deliberaAon
about	which	mode	 of	 reasoning	 is	 instrumentally	most	 useful	 in	 any	 given	 situaAon.	 In	 response	 to	 the
second	quesAon,	one	aspect	that	diﬀerenAates	the	suggested	answers	is	whether	they	allow	team	play	to
advocate	a	potenAal	sacriﬁce	of	some	members	of	a	team	for	the	beneﬁt	of	others.
The	results	of	the	nascent	developments	in	empirical	tesAng	of	the	theory,	a	number	of	which	we	reviewed
in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter,	 are,	 at	 best,	mixed	 and	 further	 research	 in	 this	 ﬁeld	 is	 needed.	 The
studies	start	from	the	assumpAon	that	the	games	they	use	are	situaAons	where	people	could	be	expected
to	 team	 reason.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 of	 them	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 providing	 indicaAve	 answers	 to	 the	 ﬁrst
quesAon,	“when	do	people	reason	as	members	of	a	team?”,	because	they	arguably	idenAfy	circumstances
in	which	people	are	 likely	 to	 team	reason.	One	 interpretaAon	of	Faillo	et	al.	 (2013)	 is	 that	ex	post	Pareto
dominance	and	equality	play	an	important	role	in	group	idenAﬁcaAon.	One	interpretaAon	of	Colman	et	al.
(2014)	 is	 that	 the	 team	 reasoning	 outcome	 needs	 to	 be	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	 complex	 or	 cogniAvely
demanding	 games	 lead	 people	 to	 randomise.	However,	 these	 are	 speculaAve	 hypotheses	 which	 were
developed	post	hoc	to	explain	the	experimental	results	and	they	sAll	need	to	be	put	to	the	test.	None	of	the
experiments	aim	to	test	the	mechanism	by	which	people	adopt	team	reasoning:	whether	it	is	caused	by	a
psychological	process	or	a	decision,	and	the	role	of	assurance	and	players'	beliefs	about	what	others	will	do.
With	regards	to	the	second	quesAon,	“what	is	it	that	team	reasoning	decision-makers	strive	for?”,	in	some
of	 the	 games	 that	 have	 been	 studied,	 the	 predicAons	 of	 the	 various	 funcAonal	 representaAons	 of	 team
interests	coincide.	This	is	ooen	so	in	Nash	equilibrium	coordinaAon	games.	But	even	then	some	diﬀerences
are	possible	(recall,	for	example,	the	interpretaAon	of	results	discussed	by	Faillo	et	al.	(2013)	based	on	ex
ante	vs.	ex	post	opAmality	of	the	considered	outcomes	and	the	idea	of	coordinaAon	among	outcomes	that
are	maximally	mutually	beneﬁcial).	 In	more	complex	scenarios	studied	by	Colman	et	al.	 (2008,	2014),	the
diﬀerences	 between	 various	 predicAons	 of	 team	 play	 loom	 larger,	 which	 may	 therefore	 oﬀer	 a	 beXer
ground	to	test	the	compeAng	assumpAons	about	team	reasoning	decision-makers'	goals,	keeping	 in	mind
that	if	games	get	too	complex	that	may	miAgate	against	team	reasoning.
Any	experimental	test	of	the	theory	of	team	reasoning	is	complicated	by	the	mulAplicity	of	hypotheses	that
are	to	be	tested	simultaneously	in	connecAon	with	the	above	quesAons.	It	may	thus	be	necessary	to	apply
methods	 that	 go	 beyond	 mere	 observaAon	 of	 decision-makers'	 choices	 in	 games,	 e.g.,	 asking	 the
parAcipants	 to	 explain	 the	 reasons	behind	 their	 choices,	 or	 encouraging	 the	 adopAon	of	 one	or	 another
mode	of	 reasoning	 through	 the	use	of	 addiAonal	 pre-play	 tasks.	One	possibility	 for	 further	 experimental
work	 is	 to	 study	 how	 priming	 group	 or	 individualisAc	 thinking	 aﬀects	 people's	 choices	 in	 simple	 Nash
equilibrium	coordinaAon	games	where	the	team-opAmal	outcome	seems	to	be	obvious.	Such	a	test	would
accord	with	 a	 number	 of	 versions	 of	 the	 theory	with	 respect	 to	what	 is	 assumed	 to	 trigger	 the	 shio	 in
individuals'	adopted	mode	of	reasoning	as	well	as	a	number	of	suggested	funcAonal	representaAons	of	a
16
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team's	goals.
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